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Forty-two Years of Peacekeeping: A Review of Senegalese Participation in Peacekeeping Missions

Thesis Statement

Senegal, one of the smallest African countries (in land mass) and with a population around 10 million, is one of the leading African contributors to peacekeeping efforts. Senegal's peacekeeping efforts have not only been on the African continent, but elsewhere in the world as well. When compared to other nations around the globe, Senegal has a higher participation rate (as far as numbers of troops deployed to peacekeeping efforts) than many larger countries, including the US in most instances.

This paper will examine both the reasons for and the consequences of Senegal's extensive participation in such missions. It will thus explore ideological and foreign policy explanations, including the possibility that the disproportionate rate of Senegalese participation in peacekeeping efforts is linked to economic compensation. When Senegalese troops participate under the UN flag, for example, they are paid up to ten times as much as they would normally earn. Additionally, the country of Senegal receives compensation for

allowing their troops to participate in the peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, in addressing the drawbacks of a high participation rate, this paper will examine the types of domestic problems that may arise and that may also produce adverse effects upon the peacekeeping missions themselves.

In preparing this paper, I have conducted research in Senegal and gathered information for this paper from various sources. I conducted interviews with military personnel as well as civilian leaders who have either participated in the missions or had a hand, politically, in sending troops on these missions.

Case Justification and Variable Identification

Being a United States Air Force Foreign Area Officer (FAO) for Sub-Saharan Africa, it is therefore unproblematic to expect that my thesis research would focus on an African issue. It is also easy to understand that my research would focus a military subject. In the beginning of my master's studies, I attempted to find a thesis topic that would meet both of these criteria. Additionally, I wanted to find a topic that would afford me the opportunity to conduct personal, hands-on research on the African continent.

Through discussions with my professors and program advisors, I was able to narrow my possibilities to a list of countries that had academic connections with the University of Kansas. This would allow me to study abroad for the summer and still meet my academic as well as my Air Force requirements. In the end, I selected Senegal to be the focus of my research, specifically the Senegalese military's participation in peacekeeping missions. This particular study will benefit my personal academic study and enhance my knowledge of African nation's participation in peacekeeping missions. Thus, my research on the case study of Senegalese participation in peacekeeping missions is one that will benefit me personally as well as professionally.

However, it is also important for me to be able to extend the relevance of my research to a larger field than that of my own personal benefit. Therefore, the validity (applicability to other regions/states) of my research is important to me. I conducted my research in such a fashion as to be able to infer the results to other areas/states of the world. It is expected that the results will be applicable to other nations with similar economic, political, and domestic demographics as those of Senegal, thus corroborating the validity of my research.

The dependent variable examined was Senegalese participation in peacekeeping missions. There were a number of independent variables that were studied to determine their effect on the dependent variable. Some of the independent variables studied in order to identify a causal link between the independent and dependent variables included: economic impact on the individual soldier and on the state, foreign policy of the state, domestic attitudes towards the missions, external political pressure, and other relevant variables that emerged during the research.

One independent variable that was not discovered until after the research had begun is one that is defined by Major Gatta Ba of the Senegalese Armed Forces as the “culture of intervention”. Through the past forty-two years, Senegal has participated in many peacekeeping missions and each time their troops have performed well. Through the successes of their troops and the confidence that success brings, Senegalese troops have created a history of participation, but there is more to the culture of intervention than just participation. Through my research I have discovered that the Senegalese soldiers, as well as the citizenry, have a true desire to aid others in need. With the desire to assist those in need, the history of successes, and the support of the citizenry, there has been created a

culture of intervention within Senegal. This culture of intervention will shine through as the research is presented and it will also be further identified and explained. In the end, the culture of intervention presented here will have to be considered as one of the independent variables along with the other variable mentioned above. From the identification of the independent variables, it is clear that it would be difficult to isolate the single variable that had the greatest impact on creating Senegalese participation in peacekeeping missions. Thus, a case of causal complexity existed.

In an attempt to apply the results of this research to other areas of the world, there was a need for a field of comparative cases to effectively analyze the evidence of the research. There are numerous cases throughout the world from which to compare the Senegalese case, and as indicated above, the research is designed to have applicability to many regions of the world. With this in mind, the choice of comparative cases will need to include cases from different regions. The regions of the world with which to compare the Senegalese case would include cases from Latin America and Asia. It is also important to validate the research with other African nations.

The primary objective behind the comparisons would be to validate the evidence from the research with other comparable states. However, there is an additional point of interest that should be examined in the comparison. Further analysis should be conducted in order to attempt to explain why nations in these other regions, which are arguably comparable to Senegal in other aspects such as total gross domestic product, population, military size, etc., are not participating in UN peacekeeping missions to the extent that Senegal is. This was an additional goal in the exploration of the evidence of the research.

In an attempt to conduct the most exhaustive and thorough research possible, I incorporated many research tactics. Those tactics included personal interviews, direct observation, and where possible participant observation. I interviewed numerous individuals serving in various capacities of the Senegalese military, government, and citizenry. All of these research tactics combined afforded me the best opportunity to get to the root cause of high participation rate of Senegalese troops in peacekeeping missions.

One of the chief objectives of the research was to evaluate the effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions at the field level. With one

aspect of the hypothesis being that Senegal allows its troops to participate (and that the troops want to participate) in these missions because of a monetary benefit (for both the state and the individual troops), it is possible that the missions may not be as effective as planned. The hypothesized reason for this is that if they are only in it for the money, the commitment, and therefore the effectiveness, might be degraded. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the hypothesis would be nullified. In order to determine the true effectiveness of the missions, it was necessary to interview the troops participating in the missions.

Methodology

In an effort to be as effective as possible in my field research, I made a preliminary trip to Senegal in order to lay the groundwork for the research. I was in Senegal as a staff member for the African Center for Strategic Studies Seminar on Health and Security issues. While there, I contacted many of the political and military personnel I intended to interview and arranged to conduct those interviews a month later.

I conducted my research in numerous locations to include Washington, D.C.; New York City, New York; Dakar, Senegal; and Maputo, Mozambique. While in Senegal, I interviewed Colonel Balla Keita, Colonel El Hadji Alioune Samba, and other military leaders who have participated in numerous peacekeeping operations. I also arranged an interview with Mr. Abdoulaye Bathily, Deputy Vice-President of the Senegalese National Assembly. He currently holds a position on the Defense Committee within the National Assembly in addition to his role as Deputy Vice-President. Additionally, I interviewed General Mamadou Mansour Seck, Ambassador of Senegal to the United States. The interviews I had with these individuals were conducted in both French and English and I had access to an interpreter who spoke French, English, and Wolof, so if there was any difficulty transmitting ideas, they were eliminated by the use of the interpreter.

On the way to Senegal, I stopped in New York City to interview numerous individuals on the United Nations staff. I was able to interview a few people from the UN staff and one person from the Senegalese Mission to the UN. Since most of the missions that Senegal participates in are UN missions, it was undoubtedly a beneficial stop for me. I also received information on the decision-

making process that is utilized to determine which countries will be asked to participate and those that are approved to participate in UN peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, while in New York, I was able to talk with UN officials on the amount and types of compensation offered to UN peacekeepers, which is relevant to the hypothesis of my research.

After my visits to Washington, New York, and Dakar, I was able to travel to Maputo, Mozambique to another Africa Center for Strategic Studies seminar. This one covered the topic of security in Southern Africa, but it brought in security specialists from around the globe and offered me many opportunities to interview experts in the field of security.

While in Senegal I also interviewed a few citizens to obtain their opinions on the UN missions. These interviews played an integral role in assessing the domestic situation with regards to the peacekeeping missions. I have hypothesized that the domestic situation, particularly in Senegal, would be strained by the participation of Senegalese troops in these missions. One reason for this hypothesis is that other countries, like Gambia, experienced a coup d'état after its troops returned home from peacekeeping missions. The Gambian

troops earned much more money working with the UN and when they returned home, they demanded the same level of salaries and they did not receive them. This ultimately resulted in a coup d'etat in 1996. It was important to examine the situation within the Senegalese military and amongst the Senegalese civilians to ascertain whether or not a coup d'etat is possible or imminent in Senegal.

In addition to the personal interviews I conducted, I also completed exhaustive research of the information that is currently available in published works. This included reviewing current literature found in books, magazines, and other literature resources. I was primarily interested in obtaining literature that discusses the following topics: the structure of the UN organ that manages the deployment of troops, the theory and past experiences with UN peacekeeping missions, the Senegalese participation in peacekeeping missions, and the political policies that allow (or not allow) other nations of similar size and wealth of Senegal to participate in UN peacekeeping missions.

Literature Review

Peacekeeping Theory

Beginning with the creation of the League of Nations, it was apparent that the member states, and arguably non-member states, had seen the relevance of a collective security system. So in the charter of the League of Nations, the theory of collective security was laid out.

However, when it came to the ability or willingness to apply the theory in practice, the member states failed. Some examples to illustrate that failure are the Manchurian War between China and Japan (1931-33), Italy's invasion of Ethiopia (1935-36), and the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). In each of these cases the League failed to organize as an effective collective security mechanism. These failures contributed to the ultimate demise of the League.

With the end of World War II, and having experienced the horrors of the war, the nations of the world were faced with the challenge to either rebuild the League of Nations or to devise an entirely new organization. As history has shown, they chose to create a new organization that is known as the United Nations (UN). The creation of the UN once again placed the ideals of peace and security at the forefront of the international agenda. This was made very clear in the

beginning of the Charter of the UN. Article 1, paragraph 1 states the purpose of the UN is:

“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace.”

In order to accomplish the goal of maintaining international peace and security, the UN included in its charter in Chapter VI the guidelines for pacific settlement of disputes. In Chapter VII, the UN outlined non-pacific means for handling breaches of peace and acts of aggression.

In 1950, the situation in Korea challenged the UN and its goal of collective security. The North Koreans, allied with the Soviet Union, had crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. This act was perceived as an act of aggression by the predominantly Western-allied

General Assembly of the UN. The US and other Western allies, primarily NATO allies, took advantage of the Soviet Union's boycott of the Security Council and passed a resolution calling for the North Koreans to retreat back across the 38th parallel. The North disregarded this call and proceeded deep into the south of the Korean peninsula. This action generated a response led by the US which created a Unified Command, led by the US ranking officer in the Pacific region which happened to be General Douglas MacArthur. General MacArthur, although a UN commander, reported directly to Washington and needed only to "inform" the UN. This UN force, comprised of contingents from seventeen UN member states, pushed the North back across the 38th parallel¹. There then arose the question of whether or not to follow the retreating force into the North and counter-invade, or to hold the line at the 38th parallel.

By this time, the Soviet Union had resumed their post on the Security Council and was now, by virtue of the rotating position of president, the President of the Security Council. There was no way the UN Force was going to get the Security Council to authorize it to go into the North, so the predominantly pro-West General Assembly called for the

¹ MacQueen, pp. 14-18

establishment of peace “throughout Korea.”² This was the impetus for the UN Force to cross the 38th parallel into the North. They were subsequently repelled by a combination of North Korean forces and Chinese forces that had come to the aid of the North. The situation ended with the 38th parallel again becoming the dividing line between North and South Korean forces. This was manifested in the armistice signed by all sides in July of 1953.³ The Korean crisis displayed the fact that collective security was not easily achieved in a multi-polar world. There must be another avenue found to maintain peace and security throughout the world.

In 1953, Dag Hammarskjöld was put in place as the second Secretary General of the UN. He brought with him a more neutral ideology than that of his predecessor. His “loyalty appeared to be to the organization [UN] first rather than to any national or bloc interests within it.”⁴ With this more neutral approach, the UN shifted its focus from collective security to “preventive diplomacy.”⁵ This shift forced the UN to think of intervening in conflicts early or even before they arise rather than to react with force using Chapter VII authorization as its basis. This ideological swing forged the way for a new form of

² MacQueen pg. 17

³ MacQueen pg. 18

⁴ MacQueen pg. 21

⁵ MacQueen pg. 21

maintaining international peace, the form which is now referred to as peacekeeping.

In February of 1956, the UN deployed its first peacekeeping mission, United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) to the Suez Canal in response to the threat to international peace. In 1965, the UN general Assembly, recognizing the possibility for future operations, created the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations. This was the first "official" UN peacekeeping mechanism.

However, the Special Committee was not very effective in creating peacekeeping missions during the Cold War period. The primary reason for this was that the United States and the Soviet Union were (and still are) permanent members of the UN Security Council. Either of these states could, and often did, veto any security proposal that was not in their interest. This led to very few instances where the two superpowers, at opposite ends of the bipolar international community, agreed on security proposals. Therefore, there were very few opportunities for the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations to exercise its designed mission.

However, despite the differences that existed within the UN Security Council, there were several UN peacekeeping or observation missions that occurred during the Cold War years. These missions took place in the following countries or locations: Cyprus, Lebanon (twice), Congo, Yemen, India-Pakistan, West New Guinea, Suez Canal, and the Arab-Israeli conflict over the Golan Heights.

With the end of the Cold War, there emerged a “rebirth” of peacekeeping operations. The Gulf War ushered in a new era of peacekeeping and/or peacemaking and arguably a new role for the UN⁶. Prior to the Gulf War, it was almost absolutely requisite that all parties involved consent to the intervention of the UN and any peacekeeping mission it might embark upon. The UN Resolutions against Iraq, and the subsequent support of military action against Iraq, indicated a change in the mindset of the international community. No longer was it necessary for all parties to consent to the UN intervention. There was increasing optimism throughout the world that the UN could now become the international policeman and resolve issues around the globe. That optimism began to wane after

⁶ “Military action against Iraq to force its withdrawal from Kuwait was approved by the Security Council in November 1990. Although referring to Chapter VII, the Council did not invoke its legally binding collective security powers under Article 43 of the Charter. Operation Desert Storm was essentially an ‘independent’ alliance acting with UN authorization rather than a ‘UN force’.” MacQueen pg. 110

the poor showings of several UN peacekeeping missions which included the former Yugoslavia, Angola, Cambodia, and Somalia.

The increased need for the use of force by UN peacekeeping forces resulted in these missions being called “second-generation” missions, in contrast to the first-generation of Cold War missions where there were very few instances of use of force by UN forces. Most Cold War UN missions were primarily “observer” missions. The UN forces were there to stand between two opposing forces, but they were not allowed to engage the opposing forces in any type of peacemaking or peace enforcement actions.

With the failures of the UN missions identified above (primarily due to over-extension of forces and lack of training for the complex roles of the second-generation missions) there was an increasing disenchantment with the UN. The image of US soldiers' bodies being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, and the image of incompetence in UN peacekeeping missions lead to a decreased level of international support for these missions. With the decreased support came decreased funding. Therefore, the UN has been unable (and arguably unwilling) to engage in second-generation peacekeeping missions.

The UN certainly still has an obligation, in accordance with Article 1, paragraph 1, to continue to engage in peacekeeping missions, but it has become more selective in the missions it chooses to become involved in. In several cases the UN has relinquished the responsibility to sub-regional organizations. One such instance was found in Liberia. The UN played only a supporting role to the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In addition to the sub-regional groups, the UN has encouraged "home-grown" solutions to situations that arise. The UN is still the over-arching leader for the missions, but the majority of the manpower comes from the nations most affected by the situation. For the African continent that has meant that many more African nations have become participants in peacekeeping on their continent. This brings us back to increased Senegalese participation in peacekeeping missions.

African Responses for Africa

The literature on this aspect of peacekeeping is somewhat limited because of the short amount of time that African nations have been primarily responsible for resolving their own situations. However,

there have been a few authors who have written on this topic. The information is also limited because of the lack of cases where African nations have intervened militarily in the affairs of other African nations. For years, the governments of Idi Amin in Uganda, Jean-Bedel Bokassa in Central African Republic, and even Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire were allowed to oppress the people of their nations without fear of intervention from anyone on the continent.

As identified above, the times have changed and African nations (as well as other nations throughout the world) are more apt to intervene militarily in the affairs of their neighboring states. In the African cases of this type of intervention, the African nations have decided they are tired of relying on the West. They have the willingness to intervene, but often they lack the necessary money, equipment, and technology.⁷ Here is where the UN can play an indirect, yet integral role by supplying the items the African nations require for their operations, thereby establishing a "balanced partnership."⁸

At a Malawi conference attended by Ministers of Defense, chiefs of staff, and former military leaders, the countries of the Southern

⁷ Rotberg et al, pg. 107

⁸ Rotberg et al pg. 107

African Development Community (SADC) (except South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) along with Senegal, Uganda, Kenya, and Ghana unanimously declared:

- “a willingness of Africans to do their own peacekeeping and peace enforcement, with substantial help from the West
- an African desire to train and organize peace enforcers systematically
- the strong belief that peace enforcement should be developed sub-regionally
- an assertion that battalion strength troops should remain in their own countries until called upon to intervene, coming together in brigade-sized (4,000-5,000) strength
- the belief that Africa needed a classification method for early warning of dangerous conflicts. African countries should be ranked according to their potential for conflict, and attention should be focused on those with the highest scores.”⁹

⁹ Rotberg et al, pg. 107-8

With the African nations seemingly willing to accept a greater role in the peacekeeping efforts on their continent, it is therefore feasible that this is the reason why Senegal has a higher participation rate than many non-African nations. However, it does little to explain why the Senegalese rate is higher than that of other African nations. Thus, the need for my research emerges.

Characteristics of Bad Peacekeeping Missions

The theory discussed so far has provided characteristics of peacekeeping, and presumably good peacekeeping, missions. However, with several failed UN peacekeeping missions during the 1990s, specifically in Somalia and Rwanda and arguably in Kosovo and Bosnia, to name a few, several questions have been asked as to why these missions failed. Of the literature that is available on the theory of peacekeeping operations, there was one in particular that discussed the failures of peacekeeping missions in the 1990s. This work was entitled "Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests" and was authored by Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr.¹⁰ He argued in his work that the reason these missions failed were because of a few poor, but common characteristics. The

¹⁰ Fleitz, pp. 1-18

dominant, negative characteristic identified by Fleitz was that peacekeeping operations had evolved into "expanded peacekeeping".¹¹

By expanded peacekeeping, Fleitz identified the fact that during the 1990s (and not inconsequently, in my opinion, after the end of the Cold War), peacekeeping has taken on an expanded definition. Prior to the escalation of peacekeeping missions during the early 1990s, peacekeeping was a term used to identify missions that utilized lightly armed military troops who were put in place to maintain the peace that had been achieved by a truce, a cease-fire, an accord or by a similar diplomatic tool¹². These traditional peacekeepers (meaning peacekeepers deployed prior to the end of the Cold War) were not aligned with any of the disputant parties. Furthermore, their directives were to use force only in self-defense. Additionally, they would not be present in a dispute unless all parties agreed to their participation¹³.

In direct contrast, peacekeepers deployed during the 1990s were given new and expanded directives. These new directives included the authorization to use force against one or more of the disputing

¹¹ Fleitz, pg. 5

¹² Fleitz, pg. 3

¹³ Fleitz, pg. 3

parties. Also, they were often deployed without the consent of any of the warring parties or with the consent of only one party¹⁴. Often, the expanded peacekeeping missions “used the veneer of peacekeeping to perform other functions, often rebuilding ‘failed’ states.”¹⁵ Fleitz further argued that expanded peacekeeping was drawing closer and closer to peace enforcement, which he defines as heavily armed troops who are prepared and willing to wage war against any of the warring parties.¹⁶ As the research of Senegalese participation in peacekeeping missions progresses, it will be important to keep this characteristic identified by Fleitz in mind.

Other World Players

The overall contribution of troops from the different regions of the world is broken down as follows:

¹⁴ Fleitz, pg. 5

¹⁵ Fleitz, pg. 5

¹⁶ Fleitz, pg. 5

Table 1

Percentage of UN Troop Contributions by Region¹⁷

Asia	36.3%
Africa	14.0%
Latin America	3.4%
Europe	39.7%
USA	4.8%
Oceania	1.8%

As indicated in the thesis statement, an attempt would be made to compare Senegal's participation with that of other regions of the world. By examining the table above, it becomes obvious that the nations of Latin America are not participating very much. Some possible explanations for this may be that their constitutions don't allow their troops to participate in exterior missions, their political agenda doesn't allow for participation, or possibly they may not have the military forces or logistical support to participate. Whatever the reason for their non-participatory role, the nations of Latin America should reconsider their role. I would suggest that these nations review what Senegal has been able to accomplish with seemingly similar economical, political, and social limitations. The majority of nations in Latin America aren't wealthy nations, nor do they possess

¹⁷ *Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations*, pg. 248

militaries that are renowned for the competence, training, and adaptability. However, as the following research of the SAF will show, if they took the initiative to begin to participate in PKOs at a higher rate, they just might find their military to be as highly regarded as the SAF are in the international community.

One international player who can contribute significantly to increasing participation by Latin American nations is Spain. However, due to governmental restrictions placed on the Spanish military by the Franco regime, Spain did not become a significant contributor itself until the early 1990's in the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. Since then, though, the Spanish have taken an active role by contributing troops as well as becoming a leader and role-model for the Latin American nations. Spain has played a major role in settling disputes in Central America and has set up a training facility in Latin America which prepares Latin American police forces for UN service. If Spain continues to play this type of leadership role, and the Latin American nations realize the entire spectrum of benefits that will come from their active role in PKOs, then there is no reason why they will not be able to accomplish the same things the SAF have accomplished.

2. Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF) in Foreign Operations: Forty-Two Years of History, a Long Tradition

Introduction

During France's colonization of Africa, Senegal was the seat of government for all of French West Africa. Additionally, some Senegalese citizens received benefits not offered to citizens of other West-African nations. Specifically, some Senegalese citizens were given direct French citizenship whereas citizens of other nations had to work through an "assimilation" process to achieve the status of being a French citizen. In addition to the citizenship status, Senegalese people received direct benefits from their close contact with the French government. They gained valuable government experience and experience with democratic processes and procedures. These experiences proved valuable to the Senegalese when they finally gained their independence from France in 1960 and prepared them for self-government.

In addition to the citizenship and government experience gained, the Senegalese also gained military experience. Many Senegalese had participated in both World Wars under the French flag and gained

valuable experience as professional soldiers. When they gained their independence in 1960, the Senegalese were well prepared to create and manage their own professional army. I believe the governmental and military experience the Senegalese gained while under French control has significantly contributed to the political and military stability of Senegal today. The Senegalese learned from the French, and to this day maintain close ties with the French military, as will be shown in this paper.

Since its first involvement in peacekeeping operations in 1960 in the Congo, the Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF) hasn't stopped providing contingency forces to the United Nations (UN), Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union (AU)), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Their participation in these peacekeeping missions is the outward manifestation of the constant will of Senegalese diplomacy to hold a particular position of high regard in the world, and particularly in Africa.

The disappearance of confrontation between East and West at the end of the Cold War, solidified by an increase in the number of smaller conflicts of lower intensity and by the decline of the use of the veto power by the United Nations Security Council, has led to the thinking

that the UN should now become the policeman of the world. This has, over the past 15 years, translated into a very marked increase in UN peacekeeping missions and subsequently, and increase in the contributions of Senegal in the realm of peacekeeping operations. The increase in participation and the success achieved in these missions has set the SAF apart from many nations throughout the world, most notably, apart from other African nations.

Senegalese participation will be examined in depth in the following pages. An outline for this paper will now be provided. After summarizing, in part two of this paper, the entirety of the missions that the SAF have been involved in, I will, in the third part, put in evidence the major characteristics of Senegalese involvement in missions outside the border of their own country. In the fourth part of this paper, I will assess the human and operational characteristics of the exterior operations and try to show the accomplishments of the SAF in these missions. All of this will naturally be followed with a concise conclusion.

The SAF for forty-two years have accomplished foreign missions of service seeking peace and international stability. They have been involved in twenty-one missions to this day, in eighteen different countries involving more than 19,000 troops in forty-two years. This

is significant knowing that the SAF is comprised of only 13,000 troops and an additional 6,000 gendarmes¹⁸. The first mission the SAF participated in was in Congo in 1960, and essentially was the birth of the SAF. For the Senegalese, their missions can be categorized as one of three different types:

- missions on behalf of the international community (e.g. UN, OAU)
- missions on behalf of regional organizations (e.g. ECOWAS)
- missions executed in the framework of a bilateral agreement with their neighboring countries

This research will examine these three types of foreign actions by the military and will make, in the course of this report, the distinction between these missions and the accomplishments of each of them.

The study of the various countries associated with the interventions of the SAF revealed the fact that five of them have taken place in French-speaking countries, two in Arabic-speaking countries and one in an Anglophone country. As for the observation missions, two have taken place in French-speaking countries, two in Arabic-speaking countries and one in a Lusophone country. This statistic shows that language is not an obstacle to Senegalese participation: a great majority of the

¹⁸ Obtained from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2862.htm> accessed on 2 May 2003.

SAF officers are bilingual or even trilingual (French, English, and Arabic). This makes it possible for the SAF to answer in the affirmative to the majority of the requests from the UN and other international organizations and validates the concept of diversification in the training courses of the Senegalese army.

Intra-State Experience

The Casamance region of Senegal, the southern-most portion of Senegal, which is almost completely separated from the north of Senegal by the country of Gambia, has been a region of discord for the past twenty years. The Casamance is home to the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC). The MFDC is a rebel secessionist group seeking independence from Senegal. The MFDC is led by a former Catholic priest Diamacoune Senghor. The rebels are seeking independence for several reason, but the primary reason is that the Casamance region is a huge economic producer for Senegal, but they receive very little aid/assistance in return from the government¹⁹.

¹⁹ Obtained from <http://freedomhouse.org/survey99/country/senegal.html> accessed on 2 May 2003.

In order to keep civil operations working in the Casamance, Senegal has had to send in military troops to quell several violent uprisings and must also provide a constant military presence in the area to maintain the semblance of peace that exists there. For twenty years now, the SAF have been gathering experience in combat, peacekeeping, and law enforcement inside their own country. The rebels of the MFDC are an organized army. They possess weapons which include light and heavy guns, military-style transport vehicles, and they have been known to utilize land mines²⁰.

Over the past twenty years in the Casamance, there have been several timeframes that have been more violent than most. In 1993 and again in 1997, the MFDC forces staged violent uprisings which included several attacks on the civilian population in the Casamance²¹. The SAF increased their personnel in the area and moved in to combat the rebels and restore peace. There have been two separate peace agreements or cease-fires negotiated between the Senegalese government and the MFDC; one in 1991 and another in

²⁰ Obtained from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/inc/quinstreet.htm> accessed on 2 May 2003.

²¹ Obtained from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/inc/quinstreet.htm> accessed on 2 May 2003.

1999²². However, neither of the agreements has achieved any long-term results as far as ending the conflict. Sporadic fighting has continued to this day.

The impact of the MFDC actions in the Casamance has not been all bad. From their experiences in the Casamance, the SAF have received valuable military experience. This experience has proved to be beneficial in the peacekeeping missions Senegal has participated in. Via the Casamance, the SAF have experience with: actual combat, not just training exercises; peacekeeping; peace enforcement; and law enforcement. Each of these experiences is a characteristic or potential characteristic of the missions the SAF have or will participate in. Possessing familiarity with these characteristics provides an advantage to the Senegalese troops who participate in peacekeeping missions, because not all peacekeeping troops from other nations throughout the world have this type or level of experience.

One other beneficial experience the SAF have had is the positive experience with democracy. Since its independence from France in

²² Obtained from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/inc/quinstreet.htm> accessed on 2 May 2003.

1960, Senegal has enjoyed freedom from any type of dictatorship or tyrannical rule, and there hasn't been a coup d'état attempted by any person or group from within the SAF. These attributes are not shared by many of Senegal's fellow African nations. Because of the apolitical nature of the military members, the SAF have been able to successfully handle the situation in the Casamance²³. Later in the research, it will be illustrated that there have been at least two separate occasions where members of the military protested, but the democratic process was able to work and the military members did not use their might to obtain their desires. Their respect for the democratic process and the apolitical views they possess have kept military members from forcing their will upon the nation and the government. In fact, the United States Department of State has stated that "[m]ilitary noninterference in political affairs has contributed to Senegal's stability since independence."²⁴ The ideal of military noninterference has also contributed to the SAF successes in peacekeeping missions.

²³ Interview with General Mamadou Mansour Seck, Senegalese Ambassador to the US, Washington, D.C., 28 June 2002.

²⁴ Obtained from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2862.htm>

Table 2**Timeline of Senegalese Interventions in the World**

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Timeframe</u>	<u>On Behalf of:</u>	<u># of Troops</u>
ONUC - United Nations Operation in Congo	July 1960 - August 1960	UN	600
UNEF II - United Nations Emergency Force; Suez Canal and Sinai Peninsula	October 1973-October 1976	UN	1600 (4X400)
UNIFIL - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	March 1978 - March 1984	UN	6000 (12X500)
Fodé Kaba - Gambia	July 1981 - November 1981	Bi-lateral Agreement	2500
Inter-African Force - Chad	Late 1981 - Mid-1982	OAU	650
UNIIMOG - United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	August 1988 - December 1990	UN	30 (2X15)
Desert Shield/Storm	December 1990 - April 1991	UN	500
UNIKOM - United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	April 1991 - Present	UN	63 (9X7)
UNAVEM II & III - United Nations Angola Verification Mission	August 1991 - March 1997	UN	48 (4X12)
Liberia	October 1991 - January 1993	ECOWAS	1500
UNAMIC - United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia	December 1991 - December 1993	UN	4 (2X2)
Rwanda	December 1992 - October 1993	OAU	30 (2X15)
UNAMIR I - United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	January 1993 - May 1994	UN	30
UNAMIR II - United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	June 1994 - June 1995	UN	750 (3X250)
UNPROFOR - United Nations Protection Force; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	January 1995 - December 1995	UN	5
UNMIBH - United Nations Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Sarajevo	December 1995 - Present	UN	20
GABOU - Guinea-Bissau	June 1998 - March 1999	Bi-lateral Agreement	2500
MISAB - Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements	January 1997 - March 1998	OAU	153
MINURCA - United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	March 1998 - February 2000	UN	252 (2X126)
MONUC - United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	2000- Present	UN	1800 (3X600)
Total Contribution			19,005

2.1. Missions on behalf of the UN

2.1.1. Missions of Intervention

a. UN Operation in Congo (ONUC), 1960

In 1960, the UN integrated a Senegalese contingent into the troops being deployed to the Congo. This mission saw one of the very first uses of the now famous “blue helmets” symbolizing UN forces. The SAF, which up until then had been part of the Federation of Mali, began their military history in the Congo with one of the first UN peacekeeping operation (PKO)²⁵. The mission of the deployed battalion was to restore the peace in the former Belgian colony of the Congo which had been thrown into chaos with their new-found independence (30 June 1960). The SAF were deployed as an interdiction force between the rebel forces led by Moïse Jumbey, and the governmental forces. The strength of the battalion, commanded by the Chief of Battalion Claude Mademba Sy, was 574 men²⁶. This

²⁵ The Senegalese forces are officially listed under the Federation of Mali on the UN records for this mission.

²⁶ Interview with Non-Commissioned Officer, Major Gabriel Ndiaye (retired), Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July, 2002. The total authorized strength of this mission was 19,828 personnel. Fleitz, pg. 12

battalion was only stationed in the Congo for a relatively short period of time, 1 August-10 November 1960.

b. UN Emergency Force (UNEF) II, Sinai 1973-76

At the end of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the UN again asked the SAF to participate in a PKO, this time in the Sinai. Four separate contingents, each of 400 men²⁷, rotated in and out of this area from November 73-July 76. This was the first Senegalese deployment in this part of the world. The SAF were able to incorporate 100 troops who already had prior peacekeeping experience²⁸, thus increasing the efficiency of the mission. The SAF units were stationed in the buffer zone and their mission was to enforce a cease-fire between Egypt and Israel and ensure conformation with the UN mandate²⁹.

c. UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 1978-84

From June 1978-November 1984, twelve Senegalese contingents rotated through Lebanon and each contingent was of battalion

²⁷ The total authorized strength of this mission was 6,973 personnel. Fleitz, pg. 12

²⁸ These 100 troops had gained their PKO experience in the Congo in 1960.

²⁹ Interview with Colonel El Hadji Alioune Samba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

strength (between 500 and 600 men)³⁰. These contingents were teams of new troops put in place in this country to minimize the level of violence³¹. Deployed to the eastern pocket of Tyr, they occupied sectors more or less waiting for conflict to arise. Following the passing of UN resolutions 425 and 426, 19 March 1978, their mission was to:

- reestablish the peace and security in their zone of responsibility
- facilitate the restoration of Lebanese authority (police, army)
- prevent the rise of hostilities and to ensure that the sector of responsibility is not used in a warlike fashion by any faction

d. Operation Desert Shield/Storm 1990-91

From September 1990 through April 1991, one Senegalese battalion was stationed, and fought side by side, with the allies during Desert Shield/Storm. Senegal was the only sub-Saharan African nation to send troops to this operation. The battalion, 496 men strong, was tactically commanded by Col Babacar Gaye, and strategically commanded by Col Mohamadou Keita, future chief of staff of the

³⁰ The total authorized strength of this mission was 7,000 personnel. Fleitz, pg. 12

³¹ Interview with Colonel El Hadji Alioune Samba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

armies³². This battalion participated in all phases and aspects of the ground operations. Many members of this battalion faced an unfortunate end of their deployment when ninety-three Senegalese soldiers were killed in a plane crash upon return from Mecca. This gave Senegal the sad distinction of having lost more troops than any other country that participated in this operation³³.

e. Operation Turquoise and the UN Mission for the Assistance to Rwanda (UNAMIR), 1994-95

Starting in the month of June 1994, and continuing after the massacres perpetrated between the Tutsis and the Hutus of Rwanda in July and August, one Senegalese battalion of 241 men³⁴, in conjunction with French troops, was deployed to Rwanda for a humanitarian assistance operation in accordance with UN resolution number 929. Their mission was to come to the aid of the Rwandan refugees and the displaced populations in the southwest of that country³⁵.

³² Interview with Colonel Talla Niang, Deputy Chef d'État Major Général de l'Armée, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 22 July 2002.

³³ Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

³⁴ The total authorized strength of this mission was 5,500 personnel. Fleitz, pg. 13

³⁵ Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

2.1.2. Observation Missions

a. UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), 1988-90

Two groups of twelve officers³⁶ succeeded each other from August 1988 to December 1990 in Iraq to supervise the cease-fire at the end of the conflict between Iran and Iraq, and preceded the exchange of prisoners between the two combatants. The mission ended with the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein³⁷.

b. UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM I-IV), 1991-2003

From the month of May, 1991, four groups of seven Senegalese observers³⁸ have participated on the border of Iraq and Kuwait, to monitor the cease-fire agreements. The mission of this group is to safeguard the Kuwaiti border and to verify the absence of the Iraqi military in the exclusion zone³⁹.

³⁶ The total authorized strength for this mission was 399 personnel. Fleitz pg. 12

³⁷ Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

³⁸ The total authorized strength for this mission was 1,100 personnel. Fleitz pg. 12

³⁹ Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

c. UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II & III), 1991-97

Three groups of fifteen officers⁴⁰ have participated from May 1991-June 1997 in supervising the cease-fire signed between the Angolan government and the rebel group UNITA and to observe the elections for the month of December, 1992. Following the reemergence of hostilities between the two groups, the mandate was updated in 1995 and created UNAVEM III. UNAVEM III had the mission of observing the application of a new cease-fire made possible by the acceptance of Jonas Savimbi, the rebel leader.

d. UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), 1992-93

From 25 December 1991 to 28 December 1993, two groups of ten officers⁴¹ succeeded each other in Cambodia with the mission of participating in the supervision of the cease-fire following the Paris Accords and observing the preparations for general elections in the country. The elections were held in September 1993 and UNAMIC was then finished⁴².

⁴⁰ The total authorized strength for this mission was 655 personnel for UNAVEM II and 4,220 personnel for UNAVEM III. Fleitz pg. 12-13

⁴¹ The total authorized strength for this mission was 1,504 personnel. Fleitz, pg. 12

⁴² Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

e. UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR I), 1993-94

Thirty observers participated in this mission⁴³ from January 1993 to May 1994. It turned into a mission of assistance for political normalization in Rwanda and the disarmament of the fighting factions. The mission ended with the beginning of operation Turquoise⁴⁴.

f. UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), 1995-present

One Senegalese contingent of twenty soldiers and ten gendarmes (national police)⁴⁵ has been rotating into and out of the former Yugoslavia with the mission of observing the cease-fire⁴⁶.

2.2. Missions on behalf of Regional Organizations

2.2.1. Missions for the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

⁴³ The total authorized strength for this mission was 5,500 personnel. Fleitz pg. 13

⁴⁴ Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

⁴⁵ The total authorized strength for this mission was 2,900 personnel. Fleitz, pg. 13

⁴⁶ Interview with Captain Babacar Ndiaye, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 15 January 2003.

At the same time as the demands from the UN to send contingents to Lebanon, Senegal responded to the call of the OAU and sent a contingent to Zaire and to Chad. The goal of these deployments was to contribute to the maintenance and/or reestablishment of peace in these countries plagued by exterior insurgencies. In addition to these two interventions, Senegalese troops, participating under the framework of the OAU, were also deployed to Rwanda in 1993.

a. Senegalese Battalion in Zaire (BATSENZA), 1978-1979

On the occasion of the invasion of the city of Shaba by the "Katanga Gendarme", the OAU made a call to certain African countries, Senegal being one of them. The government of Senegal responded to the call and sent to Zaire a contingent in the framework of an inter-African force. This contingent, six hundred men strong, remained in the province of Shaba from June 1978 to August 1979. The Senegalese soldiers, as part of the inter-African force, fought next to other African nations participating in the mission. Those nations included Morocco and Gabon as well as the European nations of Belgium and France. The United States provided strategic airlift for the mission. The mission of this military force was to participate, under the supreme commander of the Zairian Military Forces, in the operations

of restoring and maintaining order in this vital region of Zaire which had been attacked by rebels from neighboring Angola. These military elements that invaded the town of Kolwezi, in the Shaba province were members of the Front National pour la Libération du Congo (FNLC). The majority of the FNLC members were part of the Lunda (or Balunda) tribal group. They had been fighting a civil war in Angola alongside their kin. Eventually their military escapades took them back into Congo where they attempted to rekindle their secessionist movement.⁴⁷ On 11 May 1978, the FNLC attacked the mining city of Kolwezi and executed 200 Europeans who had been working in the mining town⁴⁸. The OAU quickly called on African states to participate in quashing the rebellion. The fighting lasted about one month before peace was restored in the region. However, some soldiers, including some from Senegal remained in the area to ensure maintenance of the peace.

b. Senegalese Battalion in Chad (BATSENC), 1981-1982

The Chadian conflict had dragged on for a long time and the African community decided, at the summit of Francophone countries of 1981,

⁴⁷ Obtained from http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blum/Zaire_KH.html accessed on 1 May 2003.

⁴⁸ Obtained from <http://www.congonline.com/Histoire/gdsdaap.htm> accessed on 1 May 2003.

to try and find an African solution to the problem. A new inter-African force came into being and was charged with maintaining the peace between the belligerent factions. Three contingents (Nigerian, Senegalese, and Zairian) were deployed in the combat zone from November 1981 to July 1982. With a total staff compliment of 600 men, the Senegalese contingent had the mission of maintaining the peace in its zone of deployment, being Guera. The victorious entry of the Chadian Armed Forces of the North of Hissène Habre of Djamena, on June 17, 1982, made null and void the mandate of the inter-African Forces by OAU and put an end to the presence of Senegalese troops in Chad⁴⁹.

c. Group of Neutral Military Observers (GOMN), Rwanda 1992-93

From 2 August 1992 to 14 August 1993, a group of 15 Senegalese observers participated in GOMN I, formed under the guidance of the OAU. Their mission, as observers, was to return an account of the evolution of the situation. On 1 November 1993, GOMN II was

⁴⁹ Interview with Colonel Balla Keita, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 22 July 2002.

transformed into UNAMIR I and the Senegalese group then came under the command of the UN⁵⁰.

2.2.2. Missions on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

a. Senegalese Regiment in Liberia (SENREGLIB), 1991-93

From 25 October 1991 to 22 January 1993, a Senegalese regiment, with a total of 1,500 men, was engaged in Liberia with forces from other West-African states. These West-African troops were present in Liberia under the title ECOWAS Monitoring Group or ECOMOG. The ECOMOG forces were charged with putting an end to the civil war that was tearing Liberia apart and was threatening to spill over into the bordering countries⁵¹.

⁵⁰ Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

⁵¹ Interview with Colonel Balla Keita, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 22 July 2002.

2.3. Missions Executed under Bilateral Agreements

Senegal and the Gambia signed a defense agreement on 18 February 1965 binding the two countries⁵². At the asking of the Gambian governmental authorities, and under the terms of the previously signed defense agreement, Senegalese forces intervened twice in this tiny country which is completely surrounded by Senegal. The justification for these Senegalese incursions into Gambia was that the instability in Gambia directly threatened Senegal. Additionally, it is important to note that both incursions were at the asking of the Gambian government.

a. Operation Fodé Kaba I, 1980

In October 1980, following the assassination of the Gambian Chief of Field Forces (local police), a company of Senegalese paratroopers was

⁵² All indications are that this agreement was made willingly by both parties, with no amount of threat from the larger country of Senegal. This agreement was further bolstered as a result of the coup attempt in 1981, which resulted in the SAF intervening in Gambia, at the request of Gambian President Jawara, Senegal and Gambia entered into further diplomatic discussions. These discussions led to the creation of the Senegambia Confederation. The terms of the Senegambia agreement "required Senegal and The Gambia to take the following steps toward union: integrate their military and security forces; form an economic and monetary union; coordinate their foreign policies and communications; and establish confederal institutions. Obtained from *The New York Times, International*, April 16, 2000, "On Africa's Fluid Borders, My Land is Your Land". The Senegambia Confederation made no progress during the 1980s and in 1989, both Senegal and Gambia agreed to dissolve the confederation after eight years.

sent into Gambia with the mission of preventing the mass civil-disorders feared by the Gambian government. This mission was quickly concluded and the paratroopers were back in Senegal by November, only one month after being sent to Gambia⁵³.

b. Operation Fodé Kaba II, 1981

On 30 July 1981, a Marxist-Leninist movement took advantage of the absence of Gambian president Jawara and carried out a coup. Nearly 2,500 Senegalese soldiers intervened during a large operation with Senegalese and Gambian forces both participating. By 3 August, the proper authority was reinstated to power; only 4 days after the coup took place.

c. Guinea-Bissau Civil War (GABOU), 1998–1999

In 1980, President Joao Bernardo Vieira, of Guinea-Bissau, fired his commander of the armed forces, Brigadier General Ansumane Mane. The justification for the firing of General Mane was that he was selling arms to the rebels in the Casamance region of Senegal. General Mane

⁵³ Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

was not happy with being released and staged a military coup on June 7, 1998. President Vieira asked Senegal for military assistance to put down the coup. Senegal responded by deploying troops to Guinea-Bissau. While assisting with restoration of peace, the SAF launched attacks on suspected MFDC rebel camps in northern Guinea-Bissau. Senegalese troops were withdrawn in March of 1999 after a peace deal was struck between Vieira and Mane that called for the removal of Senegalese troops (as well as Guinean troops). These troops were replaced by ECOWAS forces from other than Senegal and Guinea⁵⁴.

Section Summary

The high number of external operations in which the SAF have taken part in shows the level of regard acquired by them over the years. Their reputation has risen to such a level that their presence proves to be impossible to circumvent on the African scene for any operation wanting to be credible. In the next section, an examination of the themes of these interventions will be conducted and a comparison will

⁵⁴ Obtained from http://www.historyguy.com/Guinea_Bissau_Civil_War.html accessed on 1 May 2003.

be made to see whether they show any undeniable common characteristics.

3. Major Characteristics of Senegalese Interventions

3.1 Background

In Congo, the mission was to contribute to the re-establishment of peace and of a governmental structure in a country torn apart by civil war. Initially, the Senegalese battalion was deployed in the city of Kivu, for 14 days. Major Gabriel Ndiaye⁵⁵ indicates that they were able to carry out the mission of controlling their zone of responsibility. Major Ndiaye also implied the missions were conducted with exacting effectiveness and their success explains why the battalion was then redeployed elsewhere in the Congo.

In the second deployment, this time for fifteen days, the battalion was deployed in the province of Katanga, which was a very hostile sector. Like thirty years later in Liberia, the Senegalese element proved to be an essential factor in the restoration of peace in their zone of responsibility. They proved to be a reliable element and this is why

⁵⁵ Interview with Major Gabriel Ndiaye, July 2002, at Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal

they are more readily employed in hostile zones or employed to compensate the insufficiencies of other forces⁵⁶.

In Lebanon, the Senegalese battalion, having experience with maintaining a position of interposition, led a mission of interposition between Israelis and Palestinians. The results were the same as in the Congo, complete control of zone. Each company was responsible for a particular sector and established check points, while remaining able to intervene with military force if necessary⁵⁷. This type of employment required a large amount of organization. Thus, it was necessary for the Senegalese units to obtain and maintain personal relations with the belligerent units within in its zone of responsibility. They were able to successfully create and maintain the necessary personal relations.

The restrictions placed on movement within the buffer zone controlled by the Senegalese were confusing to say the least and contributed to making the mission more difficult. Within the buffer zone, the Israelis were allowed to move about freely while the Palestinians were severely restricted in their ability to move. The differing abilities of movement

⁵⁶ This is the conclusion drawn from the interviews conducted with Senegalese military personnel as well as the writing of Captain Giraudiere of the French Marines.

⁵⁷ Interview with Colonel El Hadji Alioune Samba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002. Col. Samba was a Company Commander in UNIFIL.

created friction between the opposing forces and increased the likelihood of provocations by both sides (there were, in fact, several short skirmishes as a direct result of the differing restrictions)⁵⁸. The constant threat of military conflict within the buffer zone required the display of a high level of professionalism on behalf of the SAF. Their zone was controlled with complete efficacy and no major violations of the cease-fire agreements occurred in their zone of responsibility⁵⁹.

In the Gulf War, the ground operations were cut out in two phases, "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm". During the first phase, missions were predominantly defensive in nature. The Senegalese battalion controlled a zone that was approximately 10 km² and protected a significant strategic site, the refinery of Saffaniyah. While carrying out their defensive mission, the Senegalese were conducting all manner of training in preparation for any event that might occur. Some of the training included nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense training as well as self-aid and buddy care. Their work and training paid off on February 21, 1991, when an Iraqi Silk Worm missile slammed into their position. The missile caused large property

⁵⁸ Interview with Colonel El Hadji Alioune Samba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

⁵⁹ Interview with Colonel El Hadji Alioune Samba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

damages and wounded eight soldiers, four of them very critically. The situation could have been much worse had the Senegalese troops not been trained and prepared for any and all situations. Again, the professionalism of the Senegalese troops shone through.⁶⁰

At the beginning of the second phase of the ground operations, the battalion was to move in and carry out the missions of reducing and eliminating the Iraqi resistance on the ground. In fact, no mission of combat was carried out because the resistance was already under control or destroyed by the coalition air forces.

The study of the Liberian case is particularly interesting because, as in the Congo, one progressively sees an evolution of the mission while the situation on the ground continued to degrade. It was in Liberia that they, without a doubt, carried out the most intense actions of combat that the SAF has known since its birth in 1960. In the first phase, the regiment received two missions; firstly, a mission of controlling a zone with a vast amount of territory. It was a buffer zone between Liberia and Sierra Leone and they were also charged with controlling the border with Guinea. Secondly, in addition to controlling the buffer zone, they were responsible for the containment

⁶⁰ Interview with Colonel Talla Niang, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

and disarmament of all the belligerent factions⁶¹. Very quickly, the ECOMOG forces began to experience repeated failures due to the unwillingness of the involved factions, failures that had already resulted in actions of combat of strong intensity for the Senegalese contingent. Initially, the 3rd Infantry Battalion at Mount Cape was encircled by the rebel group National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) and cut off without any supplies for seventeen days. They ended the situation by exiting via means of force and by "the grace of God."⁶² Another example indicating the Senegalese were in an intense fighting situation was the unfortunate episode of Vahun where five soldiers of the Commando Battalion were taken as hostages and executed by the NPFL led by Charles Taylor. These two events illustrate the extreme violence of the environment of combat the Senegalese were placed in. The Senegalese contingent accurately assessed the situation and was the only one of the ECOMOG forces to adapt while being placed very quickly in a combat situation. They were also the only ones not

⁶¹ The missions assigned to the SAF were very daunting from the beginning, but with no other course of action, and the absence of any other international forces, ECOWAS had to assign missions based upon the troop strength available. This meant most of the participating peacekeeping contingents would be asked to do more than they were realistically able to. This fact contributed to the initial failures of the mission. Eventually, the mission objectives were changed to more accurately reflect the capability of the peacekeeping forces. It is important to note that the participating forces saw the situation in Liberia as very threatening to the security of the entire region. Therefore, they were initially more eager to accept the daunting tasks asked of them.

⁶² Interview with Colonel Balla Keita, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 22 July 2002. Colonel Keita was the commander of the SAF Battalion Headquarters in Vahun.

surprised by the offensive of October 15, 1992, and therefore, were the only ones who were able to react effectively.

The second phase of the battles in Liberia was a phase of open war during which the ECOMOG forces ensured the defense of the capital city, Monrovia. The contingents were initially placed in firm defense around the capital city. The perimeter was initially lost to the NPFL forces but was then quickly regained. This phase of the operation was marked by the preeminence of the Senegalese units. The Senegalese contingent, which proved to be a reliable element, participated in all the sectors of the operation and was the only one to achieve its goals within the time limits during these three months of uninterrupted combat⁶³. The US Ambassador to Liberia told General Mamadou Mansour Seck (the SAF commander) that "if the SAF withdrew from Monrovia, he was going to close the embassy"⁶⁴, thus displaying the US level of competence and trust in the SAF.

ECOMOG had planned a counter-offensive for January, but it was cancelled due to the withdrawal of the Senegalese forces. They were called home due to "national requirements" (presidential and

⁶³ Interview with Colonel Balla Keita, July 2002, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal.

⁶⁴ Interview with General Mamadou Mansour Seck, Senegalese Ambassador to the US, Washington, D.C., 28 June 2002.

legislative elections, and the increasingly intense situation in the Casamance) by the high authorities of the country. The actions of the Senegalese units in Liberia can be a legitimate source of pride for the SAF. Engaged in a long campaign (15 months) with a harsh environment, they continually adapted to every situation, i.e. rapidly changing roles from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, and became the elite force within the structure of ECOMOG.

This section of the study will be closed with the study of one of the most recent operations carried out by the SAF, Operations Turquoise (in cooperation with France) and UNAMIR II in Rwanda. For Turquoise, three missions were assigned to the Senegalese contingent: firstly, to ensure the integrity of its portion of humanitarian protection zone (HPZ) vis-à-vis the Rwandan Patriotic Force (RPF) with a Tutsi majority; secondly, to ensure the safety of the populations by fighting against the executions; thirdly, to facilitate humanitarian action and the rebuilding of the country while ensuring medical aid to all in need. For UNAMIR II, it was a question of creating an atmosphere of legality and order by the installation of the civil authorities named by the Rwandan government, and of reversing the migratory flow of refugees which amounted to two million people in the HPZ, and finally to control and facilitate the rehabilitation of the government.

The geopolitical agenda behind this operation has been examined with mixed results. The French pressed the UN very hard for the creation of this operation, and many believe the French were primarily interested in maintaining their "sphere of influence"⁶⁵ in the area. Also, many believe that it was intense political pressure from the French that coerced the SAF into participating in this operation. Those who subscribe to this opinion believe the French were very interested in preventing the toppling of the Mobutu regime in Zaire⁶⁶. However, there are those who believe the French pressure for this operation was a result of "genuine humanitarianism"⁶⁷.

In the end, the humanitarian aspect of Operation Turquoise was deemed to be successful. The operation was able to provide a humanitarian protection zone in southwestern Rwanda, thus providing safety for numerous refugees. However, Operation Turquoise was not able to prevent thousands of massacres that occurred elsewhere within the country of Rwanda. The French troops withdrew in July of 1994 and in August further massacres were carried out⁶⁸. It appears that either side of the mixed opinions for

⁶⁵ McCoubrey and Morris, pg. 133

⁶⁶ McCoubrey and Morris, pg. 133

⁶⁷ McCoubrey and Morris, pg. 133

⁶⁸ McCoubrey and Morris, pg. 133

justifying operation turquoise can be supported by the mixed results of the operation itself.

This chapter is rich in lessons and many individual characteristics, as well as collective, appear. For example, the permanent spirit of adaptation shown by the Senegalese soldier in any situation and its extensive knowledge of certain missions that it was frequently called upon to fulfill on the ground (this will be examined further in the fourth part of this study which is devoted to the assessment of Senegalese interventions).

3.2. Selection of Personnel

In operations in Congo, the SAF inaugurated a policy of individual selection of personnel sent on foreign peacekeeping missions: their participation is never a symbolic gesture or moved purely by financial considerations, as is the case for other countries in the world. The remainder of this section will go to prove this.

There is no question as to the conviction of the SAF; from my exposure to and experience with SAF members, it is evident that they are dedicated to the missions they are asked to accomplish. Through

the successes they have achieved, they have become excellent ambassadors of Senegal abroad. The Senegalese government is careful not to deploy troops solely to make a symbolic gesture, but the troops are sent with the firm intention to fulfill the mission which is assigned to them, regardless of where the assignment originates from.

The result of this policy clearly appears when one observes Table 1, entitled "Timeline of Senegalese Interventions in the World." The SAF have acquired a level of credibility that has resulted in the significant growth of their participation in PKOs throughout the world during the last fifteen years.

3.2.1. Rigorous Individual Selection:

Since their participation in ONUC (1960), the selection of personnel to participate in these missions has continually been limited to only the most qualified personnel and thus goes to effectively justify their reputation to those who have commanded these contingents. The deployed battalion is generally formed around a core of paratroopers

who are, as much as possible, selected from those who have previous deployed experience⁶⁹.

In Lebanon, the selection of the personnel confirmed this composition of troops. There were three units which formed the structure of the deployed contingent. Two of those units were from the regular active duty forces (URG) (a company from the paratrooper battalion and a squadron from an armored battalion). The third unit consisted of a mixture of younger recruits and veteran soldiers, the latter of which occupied the key positions⁷⁰.

There are certain aspects of Senegalese participation in PKOs that remain constant: as long as the constraints of internal national security and safety allow it, the deployed units and contingents are elements of the URG. With this being the case, the professionalism and effectiveness of the operation is guaranteed, as far as the Senegalese participation is concerned.

One aspect of the selection process must be examined a bit closer. As indicated in the thesis statement, it was believed that competition to

⁶⁹ Interview with Colonel Talla Niang, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 22 July 2002.

⁷⁰ Interview with Colonel El Hadji Alioune Samba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

be assigned as part of a peacekeeping contingent, particularly as a member of the monetarily lucrative UN missions, would lead to unrest among the troops and possibly become the spark for a military uprising. In fact, there have been two such cases of military unrest that can be directly linked the monetary (or lack thereof) aspects of the peacekeeping missions and they are delineated below.

During the operation to Bangui, the capital city of the Central African Republic, there was some internal conflict within the ranks of the military related to payment of the soldiers. The first contingent that was sent to Bangui was sent on behalf of the OAU. The second contingent sent to Bangui was there on behalf of the UN. The soldiers representing the UN were paid more than those who represented the OAU and this caused a great deal of dissatisfaction amongst the soldiers of the first contingent. The level of malcontent rose to such a level that the soldiers organized a protest in March of 1998⁷¹. This was the very first time in the history of the SAF that soldiers had publicly demonstrated their unhappiness with the way they were being treated. They protested for ten hours near the main roads to the airport in the capital city of Dakar. It is important to note that the

⁷¹ Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Saïdou Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 18 July 2002.

soldiers protested without the use of their weapons, it was more along the lines of a civilian protest rather than a violent military uprising. There were negotiations between a representative of the soldiers and the government and through the negotiation process, the soldiers were promised a pay raise. However, in display of a true understanding of democracy and the military's role within a democracy, General Gueye, the current Chef d'État Major Général de l'Armée (CEMGA), the equivalent to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, refused to allow the implementation of the pay increase because he didn't want to set a precedent of allowing the military to railroad the democratic process⁷². After the ten hour protest, and after the negotiations, the soldiers returned to their barracks, figuratively speaking. In the end, the pay raise was implemented, but not at the proverbial tip of the bayonet.

A similar protest took place in the winter of 2001. While the first contingent of SAF was deployed to the Congo under the UN operation MONUC, they came across a copy of the official Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)⁷³ between the government of Senegal and the

⁷² Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Saïdou Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 18 July 2002.

⁷³ An MOU is the official document that clearly defines which parties are responsible for each aspect of the missions. It identifies who is to supply what equipment, and how much and in what form compensation will be paid to the participating nations.

UN. After reading the MOU, the soldiers discovered their government was getting paid more than they were getting compensated for their participation. This meant the government was making money off of their participation and not all of the money was being funneled down to the individual soldier level⁷⁴. Upon their return to Senegal, these soldiers from this first contingent staged a protest outside the city of Thies⁷⁵. There are two main roads that go to Thies and they come together at a fork in the road and this is where the soldiers chose to protest. Their protest blocked both roads and disrupted the traffic going into and coming out of Thies. Again, the soldiers demonstrated without the use of their weapons. The protest was eventually settled in a peaceful manner, with another promise to increase pay for the military. However, the Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade devised an ingenious tool to curb further protests regarding pay issues. He ordered the military to draft a contract that each deploying soldier must sign. This contract clearly outlines the rules of engagement for the soldier. They are told where they are being deployed to, what their role will be when they get there, an approximate amount of time they

⁷⁴ This is a common occurrence for many nations who provide peacekeepers. They send their troops to participate and make money for the nation by doing so. However, in the Senegalese case, the soldiers expected not to be treated as a money-making tool for their nation and felt they deserved full compensation for their service.

⁷⁵ Thies is the location where the majority of the SAF training is conducted. Their military service academy is located at Thies which is a symbol of their military.

will be deployed, and most importantly, for the sake of this research, how much they will be paid for their participation⁷⁶. What if the soldier refuses to sign the contract and doesn't want to go? Well, there are enough soldiers standing in line to go on these deployments that the government and the SAF do not have to worry about coming up short on the number of soldiers desiring to participate. This contract gives the soldier no course for complaint, because they agreed to the terms of the contract prior to their deployment⁷⁷.

In the analysis of the overall personnel selection process, the two minor protests staged by the soldiers has not done enough damage to overcome the otherwise gleaming record of personnel selection for deployment to exterior missions.

3.2.2. Mass Involvement, but not for Symbolic Reasons:

The volume of SAF deployed is constant, even when the constraints are very intense, which have sometimes required adaptation and ingenuity with regard to the original plans. For example, in the Gulf War, four days after the dissemination of the decision to participate,

⁷⁶ Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

⁷⁷ Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Saïdou Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 18 July 2002.

the Senegalese contingent left Dakar. Their departure did not negatively impact the operational potential of the SAF at home. This was very important because there were the beginnings of hostilities in neighboring Mauritania and the continuing subversive acts of the guerrilla movement in the Casamance. The SAF capabilities were not diminished or deteriorated in any way by the departure of the Gulf War contingent. It thus appears that the SAF never engage in exterior operations lightly and generally seek to be autonomous in their support capabilities. This is a policy which has been validated in many cases where, to maintain peace, the Senegalese elements have, in the end, been placed in a position of potential combat and must have been able to support themselves.

Thus in the Congo in 1960, the battalion had a manpower of 574 men and in an effort to enforce the directives of the UN, the head of SAF contingent decided to deploy the units with 60 mm mortars, bazookas and three units of fire. This deployment of intense firepower, in addition to the determination of the soldiers, went a long way to ensure the accomplishment of the given directives and even further in the establishment of the credibility of the Mali battalion⁷⁸.

⁷⁸ Recall that Senegal was still part of the Federation of Mali at this time and were thus referred to as the Mali Battalion.

In Lebanon, the deployed battalion consisted of two motorized companies and an AML⁷⁹ squadron. This battalion, which had 60mm mortars, 12.7mm guns and 90mm canons, provided enough support fire to compliment the two other units they were deployed with.

In the Gulf War, their motorized company had an anti-aircraft section, which consisted of an 81mm mortar group and anti-tank armament. A squadron of 90 AML had been equipped with infra-red equipment. The entire SAF contingent was highly mobile and therefore able to adapt to any mission which was requested of it.

Undoubtedly, it is in Liberia that this practice of deploying a large volume of forces and ensuring autonomy with regard to its support appeared to pay dividends. In spite of the presence of more modern means to engage in warfare by other deployed armies, mainly the Nigerian army, it was the Senegalese contingent which was the most effective one. Their infantry proved to be most successful because even their young soldiers had combat experience from the tests of the Casamance, or in Gambia or Mauritania.

⁷⁹ AML (Auto Mitrailleur Légère)- lightly armored vehicle with a 7.65 mm machine gun mounted on it

The consequent engagement of forces ready to disregard their own safety for the completion of the mission seems a constant characteristic of the SAF in PKOs and is one of the keys of their success. It is a point that General Mountaga Diallo, current MONUC Sector Commander in DRC confirms: "Each contingent, battalion or detachment were to lay out, especially within the framework of the deployment, the means conferring to him an autonomy of a certain duration, while allowing it, if it had suddenly been attacked the capability to at least to defend oneself until the arrival of reinforcements or until a cease-fire, whichever occurs. For its part, it is initially while conforming to this first requirement that the SENREGLIB could take up successfully all the challenges to which it confronted, which, in the end, is the major challenge of the war."⁸⁰

3.3. Clear Temporal Characteristics:

3.3.1. Rapid Deployment:

A persistent characteristic of the SAF is to be alerted and deployed very quickly. This characteristic has become a tradition, since it was

⁸⁰ Quote obtained from Captain Mbaye Cisse, Executive Officer for General Diallo.

first initiated in the deployment of the young national army of the Federation of Mali to the Congo in 1960. The decision to send a contingent to this country was made on July 14, 1960 and on August 2 the first elements left Dakar by air. The preparations took two and a half weeks. This is all the more remarkable with the understanding that the young national army was in full training and knowing that the battalion was a mixed unit made up with 55% Senegalese and 45% Sudanese⁸¹.

The participation in the Gulf War is another illustration of this characteristic. In spite of intense constraints of internal safety (maintaining a constant presence on the border with Mauritania and also in the Casamance), the SAF succeeded in organizing and quickly deploying a battalion of 496 men to Saudi Arabia. This was possible thanks to the quick reaction of the command and to the rapid and judicious selection of personnel.

⁸¹ This reference to Sudanese refers to those who came from what is historically known as French Sudan which is now the state of Mali. On 18 August 1890, the French had captured the area known today as Mali and renamed it French Sudan. On 24 November 1958, French Sudan gained autonomy from the Federation of French West Africa and was renamed the Sudanese Republic; 4 April 1959, the Sudanese Republic joined with Senegal to form the Federation of Mali; 20 June 1960, the Federation of Mali gained independence from France; 20 August 1960, Senegal withdrew from the Federation of Mali; 22 September 1960, Sudanese Republic was renamed Mali. Information obtained from <http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Mali.htm> accessed on 2 May 2003.

Again, one finds this characteristic present at the time of the intervention of the SAF in Rwanda for Operation Turquoise: France asked for the participation of the SAF at the beginning of June 1994, it was also selected by the UN on June 22. They arrived at Goma, DRC, on June 25 at dawn. The preliminary detachment put itself at the forefront immediately. On the following day, a group of SAF, accompanied by their French comrades, went out on patrol for their first mission in Rwandan territory.

In spite of these very short-notice deployments, the missions were accomplished by the fact that:

- the logistics were generally light, or is ensured by an allied army
- the SAF showed a quick reaction and a good amount of experience
- they studied the deployment with pragmatism and the operational tasks were given top priority.

The SAF are a small army which can be mobilized for sending a contingent and has profited from the experience gained by its leaders during preceding interventions

3.3.2. Long Durations of Intervention:

Another prominent characteristic coming from this study is the long duration of the interventions carried out by a homogeneous contingent (meaning the same men are deployed for the duration of the operation with no rotation of forces).

With the exception of the 1960 Congolese mission (an operation that was aborted for political reasons) as well as the two interventions in Gambia (operations with limited force and limited in time out of respect of sovereignty), it is realized that all of the SAF interventions have lasted at least six months to fifteen months in duration.

The next part of the study will encompass the seven major interventions carried out by the SAF, major in the sense that they imply large volumes of forces consolidated over one significant period. The Sinai involved 400 men over six months, Lebanon 600 men over six months, Zaire 600 men over fourteen months, Chad 650 men over eight months, the Gulf War 500 men over eight months, Liberia 1500 men over fifteen months, and Rwanda 250 men over six months. Let us consider from now on that the average volume of manpower of a Senegalese contingent is 500 men. To obtain one average duration of

intervention for a homogeneous contingent, it is thus necessary to consider Liberia as a coefficient of 3 ($1500 = 3 \times 500$) and Rwanda as a coefficient $\frac{1}{2}$ ($250 = \frac{1}{2} \times 500$). With this stipulation in place, it can be determined that the average duration of intervention, and thus deployment of SAF, is ten months long.

This average duration of ten months is extremely long in comparison to US standards of three months (excluding Navy personnel's six month sea-duty tour). This aspect is further accentuated by the fact that in most operations the same units (URG) are selected for these PKOs. This average length of deployment does not take into account the time that the units are deployed away from home for internal security purposes (i.e. to the Casamance).

It can be thus concluded, that the SAF, and even further defined that certain URG units, spend long periods of time away from their home station and do so quite often.

3.4. Weak but Viable Logistics

The logistics of the Senegalese interventions is, in general, often ensured by an allied army who is also participating in the mission

while the SAF themselves are able to provide limited amounts of the necessary materials⁸². However, these characteristics are some of the major elements that facilitate the high-speed deployments mentioned in the previous section. Although the equipment and materials are often provided by foreign countries, that equipment is not necessarily foreign to the SAF. The SAF has, over the years, familiarized themselves with the equipment of their allies through various avenues including: combined exercises; training in allied training courses, to include military academies; and previous peacekeeping experience with the same allies and equipment. So, although the equipment and material might be provided by a foreign country, the performance of the SAF has not been hindered by unfamiliarity with the equipment. This will be proven through specific examples later in this section.

It will also be shown that the logistical preparation for deployment is never a last minute effort, but rather an effort that is the fruit of great pragmatism and of dialogue between the SAF and its allies.

Additionally, in spite of the poverty found in the nation of Senegal, the SAF do not suffer from logistic poverty, the reality of the situation is quite to the contrary.

⁸² Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

These opening remarks are acutely illustrated in the Senegalese intervention in the Congo in 1960. Their initial logistical deployment was light, but their overall logistical supply was ensured, in large part, by France. The French were quick to ensure the success of the Malian battalion because this battalion was seen by the French, and many others throughout Africa, as an extension of the French influence on its former colonies. Therefore, the men were equipped to the nines with every necessary piece of equipment⁸³.

If the logistical deployment was not sufficient, it would certainly not be for a lack of adequate preparation. For example, imagine that, in an attempt to accomplish the UN directive, the head of the SAF contingent decides to deploy with 60mm mortars, bazookas and three units of fire. This decision is not made lightly, but is made with serious thought for preparation and is significant because it is the basis for success in future potential conflicts on the ground.

However, conflict is not a durable concept, but rather a fluid state of action. With that in mind, it is conceivable that secondary logistical deployments may be necessary. If that is the case, the SAF are

⁸³ Interview with Non-Commissioned Officer, Major Gabriel Ndiaye (retired), Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July, 2002.

prepared for that and will deploy the secondary shipment as rapidly as they did the initial shipment. This flexible capability was illustrated in the Liberian conflict when the Senegalese quickly found themselves confronting a significant rebel resistance and realized they were going to need additional supplies. The call was made and the supplies were deployed quickly enough so that there was no detrimental impact on the SAF capabilities or on the overall mission⁸⁴.

In Lebanon, the logistical supply was ensured by the UN. The support level for the basic unit was ensured by the battalion itself which worked with the equipment they were able to bring with them. At the higher level, the brigade worked with the Detachment of Logistical Support (DLS) of Nakoura, a French detachment. The procedures, which were sometimes difficult to accomplish within the framework of the UN, were easily facilitated by the use of the same language with the French⁸⁵.

In the Gulf War, the logistical support was ensured, in large part, by the Saudis. In fact, the Saudis deployed their equipment for the SAF to use. The Senegalese only had to deploy their people and their

⁸⁴ Interview with Colonel Balla Keita, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 22 July 2002.

⁸⁵ Interview with Colonel El Hadji Alioune Samba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

communications equipment, the remainder of the necessary equipment was waiting for them upon their arrival at Dhahran⁸⁶. Here the pragmatism and the logistical adaptability of the SAF are evident once again.

This adaptability was not only facilitated by the fact that Saudis had the ability to provide the necessary equipment but also, and without any doubt, by the eagerness of the Saudis, in the times of crisis, to see their allies arrive on the ground quickly. In addition to the Saudi equipment, the NBC equipment was provided by the French army three weeks after the arrival of the Senegalese battalion. This was made possible due to the SAF contact with the arm of the French army forces in Riyadh.

In Liberia, the logistical support of the contingent was ensured on the one hand with material from Dakar (with some support coming from the US) and, on the other hand, from Monrovia with the material provided by ECOMOG. The essence of the ECOMOG support consisted of fuel from Nigeria and additional supplements of office supplies, drugs, spare parts, etc. made available by the small amount

⁸⁶ Interview with Colonel Talla Niang, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

of funds allocated by ECOWAS. The material coming from Dakar was delivered to Monrovia by civil and military air and by maritime routes. The replacement of the equipments was carried out according to their logistical plan or as needed upon request⁸⁷.

Lastly, in Rwanda, at the time of Operation Turquoise, SAF logistics was ensured by the French once again. As a matter of fact, the French provided the logistical supplies for the all of the French-speaking contingents. The provided material included ten Sovamag vehicles⁸⁸, a Lot 7⁸⁹, and Creuseuse Pelleteuse 20 (CP20)⁹⁰. The logistical co-operation was obviously simplified by the standardization of the armaments and the equipment between the SAF and the French Army⁹¹. This standardization originates from the French military presence in Dakar and the joint training exercises carried out between the two militaries.

On the whole, one can consider that the SAF makes the best of the situation they are presented with by making the most of the modest

⁸⁷ Interview with Colonel Balla Keita, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 22 July 2002.

⁸⁸ Sovamag vehicle- French medium-sized unarmored vehicle that resembles a Jeep and has good off-road capability

⁸⁹ Lot 7- a recovery vehicle attached to a maintenance unit. It is a tow truck for military vehicles

⁹⁰ CP20- a vehicle that has an attachment designed for cutting trenches

⁹¹ Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

means and provisions they have. The modest means available to the SAF helps to explain their adaptability, which is a recurring characteristic of the SAF. Another difficulty conquered by the SAF is that the fear of logistical insufficiency, which could be incapacitating to the forces on the ground, has not manifested itself. This is due, in large part, to forward-thinking logisticians who take advantage of every opportunity presented to them. In other cases, these same logisticians proactively create opportunities by seeking bilateral and multilateral training exercises and missions. In the end, in spite of their modest means, the SAF has always sought to, and in most cases succeeded in, making every opportunity presented to them a profitable one.

The general study of the Senegalese interventions thus far reveals a certain number of recurring characteristics: 1) the choice of which missions to participate in are decided as a result from pragmatic consideration, 2) the existence of a rigorous individual selection process, 3) never involving themselves for purely symbolic reasons, 4) rapid deployment, 5) relatively long durations of intervention, and finally, 6) overcoming weak logistical means through multilateral cooperation and coordination. These characteristics are the individual and collective qualities reflective of the personnel that

participate in these interventions. The individual qualities of the SAF personnel will be the focus of the next part of the study.

4. Assessment of the External Operations:

4.1. Human Assessment:

4.1.1. Qualities of the Senegalese Soldiers:

a. High State of Readiness:

Previously, it has been stated that the Senegalese army is one that is highly solicited. The numerous requests for the Senegalese army have led to increasing demands and pressure on the individual soldier. Some of the pressures are enumerated below:

1) It is necessary to take into account the fact that these operations are oft times carried out without the support or consultation of the citizens of the country. For example, in the Gulf War and Operations Fodé Kaba I & II, the SAF were deployed within four days or less. This fact would seem to suggest that there was little or no time for consultation with the public.

2) It is also necessary to recognize that the soldiers who participate in these missions typically come from only a few select units. That is to

say, the same units are called on over, and over again to provide their services. These units come from the URG and usually are the armored battalions, the paratroopers, and the commandos.

Additional pressure is placed on the soldiers of these units because they are the same units who are frequently deployed internally to the Casamance. The time the soldiers spend in the Casamance is not included in the average duration of deployment (ten months). With this last statement in mind, it becomes quite evident that the soldiers of these high demand units spend lengthy periods of time deployed away from their home station, and their families.

3) In addition to the lengthy and repeated unit deployments, Senegalese soldiers are often deployed individually on observer missions. These types of missions are no less than one year in length.

4) Finally, it should be noted that the majority of the officers and a good share of the warrant officers of the SAF participate in one or more training courses abroad during their career. Each one of these courses is a minimum of one year in duration. These training courses are conducted primarily by the French and the US, but there are also some inter-African exercises and training programs. Additionally,

some of the SAF officers are trained in French, British, and American military academies.

Thus, one of major qualities of the Djambar⁹² is its constant availability. However, their availability is a double-edged sword. On one side, it permits the SAF to confidently participate in any mission that arises. On the other side, the frequent and extended deployments can be a factor that can weaken the morale of the soldiers. Nevertheless, the Senegalese soldiers fully understand that persistent readiness is a cornerstone to the trade of being a soldier. In fact, the Senegalese soldiers take great pride in the fact they deploy as a unit and remain in place longer than their Western comrades.

b. Adaptability

The adaptability of the Senegalese soldier is not something new as of recent. This quality was recognized decades ago beginning with the Senegalese Sharpshooters who were Senegalese soldiers serving in the French army and became infamous for their marksmanship abilities. This was highlighted by the lieutenant-colonel E.M. Kandji who notes

⁹² Djambar is an historical term in Senegal that is used to express immense pride in being a soldier for your country. The literal translation of Djambar means "warrior" in the Wolof language.

that in 1960 "the effectiveness of the Malian Battalion proved the adaptability of the Senegalese soldier to any type of mission, no matter what the dangers are."⁹³

This adaptability has also manifested itself today and is one of the main reasons for the success of the SAF on the ground. Indeed, many of the missions referred to above are examples of missions that evolved throughout its duration. For example, in Liberia, the Senegalese contingent, as well as contingents of other nationalities, was deployed in a peacekeeping role. Suddenly, the mission of peace transformed into open war and the Senegalese contingent adapted very quickly to the change. In the Gulf War, the Senegalese battalion adapted quickly to the NBC threat, a threat that placed the SAF in an operational context that was very different from that which the SAF had known during preceding operations. The difference between a peacekeeping mission and a wartime mission is very prominent and being able to adapt to participate in either one is a necessity for any modern-day army. Prior to the Gulf War, the SAF contingents were always entrusted with playing the role of "firefighter", extinguishing small skirmishes in conflicts of low intensity. The Gulf War required

⁹³ Obtained from an interview with Maj. Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

the SAF to exchange their blue helmets for the aggressiveness and the professionalism that was necessary to meet the specific objectives of that mission.

c. Renowned Competence:

The success of the missions entrusted to the SAF has proven the competence of the units in the field. Their knowledge, both collective and individual, of the use and projection of armaments has confirmed their competence. This competence is highlighted by the low rate of losses recorded by the SAF during their external operations. The itemization of losses is listed below:

- Lebanon: 16 killed (including four from a vehicle accident)
- Gulf War: 93 killed (all from an airplane crash) + 8 wounded
- Liberia: 14 killed + 80 wounded
- Rwanda: 2 killed (including one from a vehicle accident) + 1 wounded

Through the years, there have been an approximate total of 19,005 Senegalese soldiers deployed in exterior operations. With a total of 125 killed and 89 wounded, the percentage of loss is 7/10 of 1 %




killed and 4/10 of 1 % wounded⁹⁴. These low percentages would tend to suggest a high level of competency. Granted, the number of dead and wounded is not the sole factor to be used in determining the competency of an army, but it is without question one of the factors.

Table 3 below provides a review of the fatalities accumulated by several nations while participating in peacekeeping missions. For reason of comparison, the PKOs listed are UN missions, and the missions chosen are only the mission in which Senegal has participated. This will allow for comparison between Senegalese losses and other nation's losses.

⁹⁴ Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

Table 3

Fatality Comparison⁹⁵

 Nations with fewer losses than Senegal
 Nations with equal amount of losses as Senegal
 Nations with more losses than Senegal
 Missions with Senegalese losses

	M I N U R C A	M O N U C	O N U C	U N A M I R	U N A V E M II	U N A V E M III	U N E F	U N I F I L	U N I M O G	U N I K O M	U N I B H	TOTAL
ALGERIA		2				1						3
ARGENTINA						1				2		3
BELGIUM				10								10
BOLIVIA		2										2
BRAZIL					1	3	7					11
			3	1			53					
CHAD	1			1								2
CONGO DEMOCRATIC C-REP		1										1
CONGO PEOPLES REPUBLIC			3		1							4
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	1											1
CROATIA												0
CZECH REPUBLIC												0
DENMARK			2				7		1	2		12
EGYPT			1									1
			28	1						2		
								34				
FINLAND							7	11				18
								27				
			49	4		1	6	24			1	
GREECE			1									1
GUINEA			1									1
GUINEA- BISSAU						1						1
HAITI			1									1
HUNGARY										1		1
		2	39			2	28	1		1		
			11				9					
IRAN								1				1

⁹⁵ Data obtained from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/totals.htm>

			27					45				
			22					5				
JORDAN						1				1		2
KENYA									1			1
LEBANON								1				1
LIBERIA			1									1
MALAWI		1		2								3
MALAYSIA			6							3		9
MOROCCO			4									4
NAMIBIA						1						1
								26				
NETHERLANDS			1			1		9		1		12
NIGERIA			9					9				18
			1				8	21				
PAKISTAN			2							1		3
PANAMA							1					1
PERU							3					3
PHILIPPINES							1	1				2
POLAND							9	7		1		17
PORTUGAL					2							2
ROMANIA						3						3
RUSSIAN FEDERATION					1	3						4
RWANDA					1							1
SENEGAL					2			16				18
SLOVENIA							6					6
SOMALIA												0
SPAIN												0
SUDAN			2									2
			19				12	7				
THAILAND												0
TUNISIA		1	12									13
TURKEY												0
UKRAINE						1						1
UNITED KINGDOM		1	2					1				4
UNITED STATES			1							1		2
URUGUAY		1		1		1						3
YUGOSLAVIA							2					2
ZAMBIA												
REPUBLIC OF		1		3		7						11
ZIMBABWE					2	7						9
TOTAL	2	6	248	12	4	14	150	246	1	8	8	699
	M	M	O	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	
	I	O	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	
	N	N	C	A	A	A	E	I	I	I	M	
	U	U		A	V	V	F	F	I	K	I	
	R	C	C	M	E	E		L	M	O	B	
	C			R	M	M			O	M	H	
	A				II	III			G			

Realizing that most of the missions the SAF have participated in were peacekeeping missions, it would prove advantageous to examine a combat mission to determine a true level of competence with armaments. It would seem to make the most sense to examine the combat mission with the most deaths. However, recognizing that the most deaths resulted from a single airplane crash, it would be more beneficial to examine the Liberian mission rather than the Gulf War mission. During this mission, the last months of SAF participation were three months of uninterrupted combat⁹⁶. The SENREGLIB was

⁹⁶ Some of the fiercest combat experienced by the SAF in exterior missions was experienced in Liberia. The combat began with the following event in October of 1992. The NPFL forces captured five SAF soldiers who had went to the market for food supplies. One soldier escaped and made his way back to the Senegalese camp and reported what had happened. The situation was already tense between the SAF and the NPFL. A company commander, Capt Niang, was sent to talk with the NPFL to acquire the release of the hostages and he was taken hostage as well. Two platoons of SAF soldiers were readied and made their way through the town of Vahun towards the NPFL camp. On their way, they were ambushed in the town and a fierce firefight began at around 11:00 A.M. and continued until 5:00 P.M. There was a cease-fire negotiated between the SAF and Charles Taylor. When the SAF tried to escort their wounded to their deployment headquarters, they were ambushed again at around 7:00 P.M. This group of soldiers began fighting their way back to their camp and it took them six hours to retrace the one kilometer they had progressed into the city. The NPFL launched an attack on the ECOMOG base (which housed Nigerian, Ghanaian, and Senegalese troops). The SAF responded with mortar fire and repelled the attack. A second cease-fire was negotiated at 12:00 P.M. on the second day of hostilities. The original five hostages were returned five days later, all of them dead. The SAF withdrew their troops from this unstable region to the capital city of Monrovia and the Nigerians and Ghanaians remained. One month later all of the remaining forces were captured. Their equipment was taken from them and they were stripped of their clothing and were sent to Monrovia in their underwear. One month after that, the NPFL launched a relatively successful attack on Monrovia with the captured Nigerian and Ghanaian equipment. The ensuing battle lasted for almost six months. However, the SAF were redeployed home after the first counter-offensive due to an escalation of events in the Casamance. But for the last six months of their presence in Liberia, every soldier was gaining combat experience by the day. This information was obtained

on the front line of defense for all of the ECOMOG forces. Of the 1,483 men deployed, 14 died and 80 were wound, which gives a rate of 0.94% and 5.39% respectively. This is a low rate of loss overall, when considering the intense level of combat they experienced.

Without any doubt, these results are due to the competence of the units and particularly to their excellent and constant application of security measures, instantaneous and systematic opening of operations on the ground immediately after arrival, and reliable means of support at any time during the operation. These are characteristics that can be highlighted and underlined in every mission a Senegalese contingent has participated in.

d. Morality and Ethics

One of the characteristics of the Senegalese soldier is his attachment with morals and ethics. Whereas many contingents are often known for their compromising behavior or their purely financial interest in the intervention (particularly UN missions), the Djambars have the appearance of being genuinely interested in attempting to resolve the

from an interview with Colonel Balla Keita, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 22 July 2002.

situation for the better. This is highlighted in two manners: 1) by the attitude adopted at the time of the UN missions of interposition or control which required strict neutrality in order to maintain peace between the opposing parties, 2) by the increase in participation of the SAF in the missions of intervention over the last fifteen years.

Specifically, the increasing number of missions that the UN has entrusted to the SAF shows the level of regard the UN has for the SAF.

In the end, what makes the difference between the SAF and the other contingents on the ground, particularly the Anglophone Africans, is the love for the mission. Djambars will cling to the spirit and the letter of the mission and will not accept any compromises. Sometimes they have carried out their mission without re-supply for up to fifteen days, and did so without once considering giving up their position. A typical example of this is that of the control of freedom of movement in Liberia: from the time of deployment of ECOMOG forces to their assigned zones of control, the NPFL had sought to avoid any displacement of their forces by ECOMOG. This was done in exacting

contrast to the Yamoussoukro Agreements⁹⁷. The Anglophone forces, primarily the Nigerians, accepted the nibbling away of the credibility of the ECOMOG forces (by allowing the NPFL free movement in areas that were not designated as such) while the SAF refused to compromise their orders and ended up in combat with the NPFL in Vahun. This combat and loss of life proved to be useful: it displayed the determination of the Senegalese contingent to carry out its orders and revealed the true attitude of the NPFL which sought to undermine the efforts of ECOWAS/ECOMOG, in spite of their agreements made at Yamoussoukro.

These qualities are shared at the individual level by the large majority of the Senegalese soldiers. Above all, they reflect the total mentality of the SAF. They are the base from which the reputation of the SAF has been built. Furthermore, they are the reasons why the SAF enjoys such an excellent reputation worldwide and constitutes a reference for other African armies.

⁹⁷ There were four different meetings held in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, with the last being on 29-30 October, 1991. These meetings resulted in the Yamoussoukro Accords I-IV which outlined the agreements made between Charles Taylor and his NPFL and ECOWAS. The main theme in all of them was that the NPFL would disarm and agreed to be placed in encampments until the entire country could be disarmed and de-mined. The actions of the NPFL in the manner referenced above are clearly contradictory with these agreements.

4.1.2. Individual Enrichment

Owing to the fact that the SAF is a small but highly solicited army, the majority of its enlisted personnel, and a very large majority of its officers, have operational experience. This results in an individual richness for every soldier who gains deployed experience. Their participation in external missions generates the ability to acquire a working knowledge of the trade in the field, the opportunity to witness the command and control procedures of allies (to include Francophone, Anglophone, and all UN allies), and the implementation of the equipment and knowledge of the foreign armies. Moreover, it gives them an opening to the world by virtue of the ability to gather knowledge of different cultures and mentalities. Lastly, it teaches them much about themselves by confrontation with combat and the associated stress.

4.1.3. Validation of the System of Training

One of the greatest satisfactions gathered by SAF participation in external operations is that their successes have validated their system of training their forces. This aspect is primarily beneficial for the

leaders, but it provides increased confidence at the individual soldier level. They see the successes and are that much more confident in the skills they learn from their training.

The policy pursued on the matter of training, during times of budgetary constraints, is a policy of diversification. The training selected has made it possible for the SAF to have a pool of personnel with a great wealth of diversified experience, mainly in the fields of languages, logistics, and command and control.

The mastery of the languages makes it possible for the SAF to almost always answer "yes" for external missions thanks to a generalized knowledge of the English and Arab languages, in addition to French. The countries in which the SAF have sent contingents cover all of these languages; 1) Francophone countries or countries where French is known include Congo, Lebanon, Zaire, Chad, Rwanda, 2) Anglophone countries include Gambia and Liberia, 3) Arabic-speaking countries include Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq.

The knowledge of armaments and procedures made it possible for rapid integrations with allied forces. This fact, in particular, was highlighted in the Gulf War with regard to the knowledge of NBC

training and equipment by many SAF leaders who were educated in the Western military academies. The instruction relating to the wearing of the S3P⁹⁸, for example, could be carried out by the SAF leaders who were educated in France.

The human assessment of the external operations carried out by the SAF is thus particularly rich in revelation and lessons learned. What is important to the final analysis is that the sum of these qualities and experiences creates a true “culture of the intervention” within the SAF. This culture is shared by all, from the oldest to the youngest soldier, from the CEMGA to the lowest ranking private. Additionally, this culture makes it possible for the SAF to answer the call from any and all international organization that desires their assistance, both now as well as in the future, provided that the situation in the Casamance allows them to participate and as long as their participation is for the greatest benefit to the international community.

⁹⁸ S3P (Survetement de Protection à Port Permanent)- NBC protective equipment

4.2. Operational assessment

A number of external operations reveal, at the operational level, a certain number of characteristics. They will be examined in the following paragraphs while trying to see whether lessons have been taken into account in the organization and training for later missions.

4.2.1. Well-controlled missions

In the external operations carried out by the SAF, certain types of missions recur frequently. One can thus conclude that the SAF are proficient in that type of mission and are asked again and again to perform that type of mission. This is true, for example, for the missions of interposition within the buffer zones. The SAF possess all of the know-how necessary to accomplish this type of mission. In the Gulf War, the second phase of the operation required the SAF battalion to reduce and eliminate the resistance along the border between Iraq and Kuwait. In Liberia, the SAF had to carry out the complete range of combat missions from creating and controlling checkpoints to patrolling Liberian villages. These were missions that the SAF had carried out in the past and therefore had practical experience with achieving the desired results.

Moreover, the participation in these operations is extremely profitable in terms of training, because the SAF did not encounter the material problems with which they would have been confronted with at home in Senegal (because allied forces were providing the logistical support). Thus, they could be devoted fully and effectively to the mission and to the training of their personnel. Colonel Babacar Gaye commented on this subject by saying: "The missions were carried out without fuel restriction or constraints of the garrison life [at home], the instruction and the training received at the beginning of January 1991 achieved their goal: it permitted the Senegalese commander to focus only on the employment of his battalion [without the logistical limiting factors]".

4.2.2. Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from various engagements do not exist in the form of official documentation. They take primarily the form of articles published in the military magazines entitled *Sunugaal* and *Army-Nation*⁹⁹ or from the conferences attended by SAF personnel.

The recent creation of the DIRPA (Directorate of Information and

⁹⁹ The magazine was originally entitled *Sunugaal* which comes from the Wolof word meaning boat. To better accentuate the fact that the military was not of and for only the Wolof-speaking population, the title was later changed to *Armée-Nation* to indicate the military represented *one* army and *one* nation.

Public Relations of the Army) answers the desire to improve the internal as well as the external communication of the SAF¹⁰⁰. The documentation is undoubtedly lacking in substance of narrative or historical means. However, it is possible that there is no driving need or desire for increased documentation because the SAF are so engaged in military missions that they feel the necessary traits and characteristics are being displayed on a daily basis and need not be documented. Additionally, it should not be forgotten that Senegal is a country rooted in oral tradition and thus that the true files, in their opinion, are in the memory of the man.

4.2.3. Differences in Procedures and Ideology

A major lesson learned from the Liberian engagement was the difference of procedures and of mentalities between the Francophone soldiers, primarily the SAF, and the Anglophone soldiers, which were the Ghanaians, Nigerians, and the Sierra Leonean. The SAF handled the situation very well thanks to the policy of diversification found in the training of their personnel. In the Gulf War, no problems were

¹⁰⁰ DIRPA is the office that coordinated my visit with the SAF. Additionally, they arranged for the interviews with the personnel referred to in this paper and provided me with archival copies of the *Sunugãal* and the *Armée-Nation*.

encountered with the task of integration, as noted above. With the Francophone countries, there is, in fact, a commonality of procedure which has been forged by numerous ground exercises and validated by operations such as Operation Turquoise. Although communication is possible between Anglophone and Francophone people, it has been shown numerous times that they may have differing ideas regarding design and employment of military strategy and equipment. This difference of strategic and tactical ideas occurred in the Congo as well as in Liberia. This is a matter that can only be ironed out by repetitive combined training exercises and cross-pollination of military ideology.

This is particularly highlighted during the Liberian conflict. The commander of ECOMOG forces said the policy relied too much on “peacekeeping” and the politicians underestimated the determination of Charles Taylor and the military threat of the NPFL¹⁰¹. The Senegalese contingent had tried in vain to dissuade the ECOMOG politicians from making it a purely peacekeeping deployment; the lack of valiancy of the Nigerians, the desperate avoidance displayed by the Sierra Leonean military and the refusal to fight by the Ghanaian

¹⁰¹ Interview with Colonel Balla Keita, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 22 July 2002.

peacekeepers was censored; the vulnerabilities and the weaknesses of the ECOMOG forces became a hindrance to the operation of reconquering the lost positions. The human and material means were in place, but the men (Nigerians and Sierra Leonean) lacked the lethality, whereas the Ghanaians persisted in their refusal to fight. However, what makes the difference between the Senegalese contingent and the others, it is that the SAF has shown its capacity to manage the first phase of interventions, which is the peacekeeping stage, as well as the second phase, which is all-out war. It is well noted that the weakness of the Anglophone contingents is precisely that they are too frequently involved with the UN operations, probably for financial reasons above all others. These contingents ended up being completely disconnected from the reality of the war. It thus seems that there was in these countries a loss of the warlike spirit which resulted from the frequency of their participation in UN operations¹⁰².

Knowledge and technology can change, but it is certain that the intrinsic qualities of the soldier must remain the same in order to match the successes already realized. The rapid adaptation of the

¹⁰² Interview with Colonel Balla Keita, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 22 July 2002.

Senegalese contingent during the Gulf War proved that even though the technology and equipment was new to the SAF, the mission was still accomplished because of the qualities of the individual soldiers. These ideologies and characteristics of the SAF has become the source of the success of their contingents in external operations.

Section Summary

This information thus concludes an intensive review of the human characteristics. Readiness, adaptability in training, and morals and ethics are the competencies shared by all within the SAF. These competencies are the core to the success of the SAF in exterior missions.

The SAF maintains at its core experience and a “culture of intervention”¹⁰³ which has made it possible to promptly react to the requests of the international organizations, as long as certain aspects of logistical support are provided to them. The efforts of the Senegalese government to contribute to international stability are all the more praiseworthy knowing that the SAF come from such a small, poverty-stricken nation. It is further meritorious on their behalf

¹⁰³ Interview with Major Gatta Ba, Camp Dial Diop, Dakar, Senegal, 17 July 2002.

knowing that the SAF are also confronted with a guerrilla uprising in the Casamance which requires the significant mobilization of manpower in order to maintain law and order in an area that is sometimes very violent.

5. CONCLUSION

This study highlighted the richness of the short history of the Senegalese army. The interventions carried out have allowed the Senegalese to liberate themselves from their own domestic limitations, the foremost of which is poverty. Additionally, the participation of the SAF has allowed them the ability to validate their theoretical concepts. Lastly, the SAF have developed, at its core, a readiness to participate in interventions, which makes them a particularly viable option for peacekeeping operations.

Africa, because of the numerous civil wars that have ravaged the continent, has become known more for receiving peacekeeping troops rather than providing them. However, by engaging its military in many operations of maintaining peace throughout the world, Senegal appears to the eyes of the international community to be a bastion of hope and certainly one of the pillars of stability on the African continent. This stability has vaulted the reputation and recognition of Senegal among African nations, and arguably among the entire international community.

Lastly, the research has shown that the SAF, by possessing a mastery of foreign languages and an extensive knowledge of various international military processes and procedures, were able to adapt with ease to the many different theatres of operation they were called upon to operate in. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to think that the SAF can one day play a lead role in the continued evolution of the creation of an inter-African force designed for the prevention and resolution of the conflicts.

Through their forty-two years of peacekeeping experience, the SAF have left an indelibly positive mark on each and every mission they have participated in. Additionally, they have benefited tremendously from each mission as well. Their forces have been excellent ambassadors for their nation and they have improved their capabilities of their forces through "combined" international missions (which has forged new paths of opportunity for them vis-à-vis combined training exercises). They have garnered more monetary funds for the nation as well as the individual soldier; meanwhile the pride of the citizens of the nation has swelled with the professional and successful completion of each mission. However, the greatest advantage gained by the SAF has been the superb training and the

deployed experience gained by every soldier who has participated in a PKO.

It has become clear that the most influential independent variable determining Senegalese participation in peacekeeping missions has turned out to be none of those presupposed in the hypothesis (economic impact on the individual soldier and state, external political pressure, foreign policy of the state, and domestic attitudes towards the missions). Rather, it is the culture of intervention bred within the Senegalese government and military. Of course the other independent variables mentioned do have an impact, but none of them are more influential than the culture of intervention found within the SAF. Although the other independent variables turned out to not be the most important, nonetheless, their impact must be explained and defined as limited. This will be accomplished in the next few paragraphs.

This research has identified that there have been economic impacts on the individual soldier. Specifically, soldiers who participate in UN peacekeeping missions can, and have, earned up to ten times their monthly salary. This aspect makes UN peacekeeping missions very attractive to Senegalese soldiers, as well as soldiers from most other

third-world nations. However, through my research and personal interviews with soldiers who have participated in UN PKOs, I was very convinced that the lure of the money for the soldier is eclipsed by their sincere desire to be a part of something that is for the betterment of the recipients of the UN assistance. The soldiers believe they have the ability to help and with that belief, there is no reason why they should not offer their skills and expertise. The monetary gains for the individual soldier are certainly a welcomed benefit for their participation, but my opinion is that money is not the determining factor for their participation.

It has also been shown that the state itself benefits monetarily from the participation of its troops in UN PKOs. Each nation that sends troops to participate in UN missions is compensated monetarily for each and every troop that participates. Some nations choose to use their troops to build their national coffers by not passing the monies they receive on to the individual soldier. However, there are some nations, including Senegal, that pass a portion of the monies on to the individual soldier. The states that choose to pass some of the money on to the individual, as well as those who pass none of the money on, do gain, as a state, monetarily. However, my research has not revealed that these gains have any significant impact on Senegal's

participation in PKOs. Furthermore, the increased monetary compensation would be available to any African state, yet few of these other states match Senegal's record of participation in peacekeeping operations.

In addition to economic advantages, external political pressure was presumed to be a variable that could have a significant impact on Senegal's participation in PKOs. Through the research presented above, it was shown that there was only one instance -- Operation Turquoise in Rwanda -- where there was any hint of the idea that external political pressure could have been a reason for justifying Senegalese participation. It was shown that France applied political pressure, both through its position on the UN Security Council and through connections with the former French colonies in Africa. Senegal, being one of the closest former French colonies, in a diplomatic sense, was one of the first and few nations to provide troops for the operation.

From these circumstances, it is speculated by some that France coerced Senegal's participation in Operation Turquoise via political pressure. When this idea was suggested to those I interviewed who participated in this mission, they quickly, and very defensively,

defended their participation as a result of their genuine concern for the people, the victims of the genocide that was taking place in Rwanda. My opinion of this situation is that the evidence indicates the existence of political pressure by the France on Senegal, but the true reason Senegal decided to participate was that they believed in the altruistic reason for intervention in Rwanda; they wanted to stop the genocide and to provide humanitarian relief to the refugees in their area of responsibility.

The foreign policy of Senegal, with regard to PKOs, is not something that is readily available and written in black and white. However, through examination of the past forty-two years since Senegal's emergence as a nation, it becomes clear that the foreign policy towards PKOs is one of relentless support. Senegal emerged as an independent nation in August of 1960 at the very same time their first contingent of peacekeepers was deployed to the Congo. Since the birth of the Senegalese nation, the citizenry, the government, and the military have been supportive of PKOs, if the mission was for a justifiable reason and no lack of defense capabilities would materialize because of their participation. Nevertheless, Senegal's foreign policy towards PKOs has not played a significant role in Senegal's participation in PKOs.

The final postulated independent variable is the domestic attitudes towards participation in PKOs. The variable was partially addressed in the paragraph above, but there is a bit more that could be said about the domestic attitudes. This research has shown that the SAF have performed very well in all of the missions they have participated in. These results have increased the value of the SAF, and Senegal as a whole, in the eyes of the international community. Additionally, it has also been shown that Senegal has suffered relatively few casualties. No citizenry of any nation will stand for significant losses of soldiers who are participating in supposed peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the low casualty rate has contributed to the Senegalese citizenry's support of their participation. The increased value in the international community, the low casualty rate, and the professional conduct of the SAF is something that all citizens of Senegal are extremely proud of, and should be.

With these successful traits of SAF participation, the domestic attitude towards participation in PKOs is supportive. However, the existence or the absence of domestic support is not a limiting factor on SAF participation. In the grand scheme of things, it is always nice to have the support of the citizenry, but if the government believes the right thing to do is to participate, troops will be sent to participate,

even without the support of the citizens. This last fact indicates that while domestic attitudes are considered, they are not the compelling reasons for participating or not in PKOs.

With the originally proposed independent variables explained as they are above, it becomes quite evident that my original hypothesis that Senegal participates in peacekeeping missions solely for the monetary benefit is not supported by the evidence. The monetary benefit is an added advantage to SAF participation; however it is not the driving factor as hypothesized in the beginning of this research. The central reason for participating is the sense of obligation the Senegalese government and citizens feel they have to the remainder of the international community, or, as defined earlier, the culture of intervention. Secondary to that reason is the experience gained by the military and the exposure to allied military processes and procedures. There is no question that there is a monetary benefit to participating in PKOs, especially in UN PKOs, but to my pleasant surprise, it is not the sole factor and more importantly it is not the driving factor for Senegal's participation in peacekeeping operations.

The final analysis of SAF participation in peacekeeping operations can be nothing less than complimentary of Senegal and its military forces.

The SAF have performed well in every mission, and have played their role to a "T", all along taking advantage of every opportunity presented to them and making something positive happen each and every time.

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